



This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons

Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International license

(<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>).

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Role congruence meets feminist identity: disaggregating causes of the double bind on women political candidates

Sarah Shair-Rosenfield^{id}, sarah.shair-rosenfield@york.ac.uk
University of York, UK

Melody E. Valdini^{id}, mev@pdx.edu
Portland State University, USA

Jeanette Morehouse Mendez, jeanette.mendez@okstate.edu
Oklahoma State University, USA

Tracy Osborn, sborn@uiowa.edu
University of Iowa, USA

Studies in social psychology and political science have noted the negative impact of the “double bind” facing women leaders and candidates, which suggests that women must demonstrate both masculine and feminine attributes in order to achieve the same success as men can achieve by demonstrating only masculine attributes. Less attention has focused on how feminist identity conditions these evaluations. We focus on whether individuals’ evaluations of men and women are affected by (1) the gendered attributes associated with a candidate and (2) feminist identity. Using data from an original survey experiment in the US, we investigate the relationship between respondents’ feminist self-identification and their evaluation of a candidate’s electability. We find that respondents who identify as feminists evaluate women, feminine, and role-incongruent men candidates more positively than non-feminists. Our results suggest that feminism can neutralize some aspects of role incongruity and provide a potential boost to non-traditional leadership candidates.

Keywords women candidates • role congruence • feminism • gender stereotypes
• electability • USA

Key messages

- Strength of self-identification as a feminist shapes individual views of candidate electability.
- Self-identified feminists positively rate candidates perceived as displaying femininity.
- Self-identified feminists are less likely to punish role-incongruent behavior than non-feminists.
- Non-feminists rate role-incongruent women similarly to role-congruent men.

To cite this article: Shair-Rosenfield, S., Valdin, M.E., and Mendez, J.M. and Osborn, T. (2026) Role congruence meets feminist identity: disaggregating causes of the double bind on women political candidates, *European Journal of Politics and Gender*, Early View, DOI: 10.1332/25151088Y2026D000000136

Introduction

There is substantial evidence that people continue to associate men and women with certain stereotypes and that those stereotypes are more beneficial to male candidates. For example, the association of communal stereotypes, such as being emotional, passive, and cooperative, with women is a well-documented, worldwide phenomenon (Williams and Best, 1990; Alexander and Andersen, 1993; Huddy and Terkildsen, 1993; Sanbonmatsu, 2002; Holman et al, 2011, 2016; Valdin, 2019). As Eagly and Karau (2002) explain, this association can have negative political consequences for women leaders because leadership roles are associated with agentic, or male, stereotypes. That is to say, stereotypical masculine traits, such as being assertive, ambitious, and aggressive, are seen as the traits that “good leaders” possess. Thus, women, due to their association with communal stereotypes, are deemed less fit for leadership. This issue—often referred to as “role incongruity”—requires women candidates to navigate the difficult waters between presenting themselves as masculine enough to be a leader while retaining enough feminine characteristics to avoid punishment for violating one’s gender role (Eagly and Carli, 2012).

Yet, while the general existence of role incongruity is well established, less is known about the impact of voter beliefs on the power and impact of violating gender expectations. Scholars have found that such variables as evaluator party identification and gender mitigate the effects of gender-role stereotypes (see, for example, Sanbonmatsu and Dolan, 2009; Bernhard, 2022), have considered whether gender-role stereotypes hurt women candidates’ election chances (see, for example, Sanbonmatsu, 2002; Bauer, 2015, 2019; Sweet-Cushman, 2022), and have investigated the influence of different forms of sexism on the gap between competence and electability ratings of women candidates (see, for example, McThomas and Tesler, 2016; Cassidy and Krendl, 2019). A remaining critical nuance of the double bind that remains under-investigated, however, is the eye of the beholder: What is the impact of an explicitly stated belief in feminism on support for a candidate who displays role-incongruent traits, particularly female candidates? In other words, when a person sees a woman leader with agentic traits, how is their response to this woman affected by their own self-identification with a system of gender-egalitarian beliefs, specifically the propensity to call oneself a “feminist”?

In accordance with existing literature, we expect that not all people respond to the role incongruity of candidates in the same way, and we offer the novel contribution that a person's feminist identity neutralizes the potential negative response to role-incongruent women and men. Since the act of self-identifying as a feminist is not simply a reflection of beliefs but represents a distinct and potentially political statement about those beliefs, we argue that there is likely to be a positive relationship between feminist self-identification and a preference for women candidates and/or policies and candidates likely to address women's interests. Based on data from a survey experiment using a US national sample with over 1,800 respondents, we find evidence to support our hypotheses that people who self-identify as feminists evaluate feminine and role-incongruent candidates more positively than non-feminists do. Yet, we also find that people who do not identify as feminists evaluate role-incongruent women more positively than role-incongruent men. Taken as a whole, we find that the impact of role incongruity on women's electoral success is more complicated than previously assumed. Our evidence suggests that reactions to role-incongruent candidates are conditioned by the factors driving an evaluator's own identification as a feminist rather than the demonstration of role incongruity itself.

The centrality of sex-role stereotypes for women candidates and leaders

While existing literature has demonstrated that voters make assumptions about the traits and skills of candidates based on their gender and that feminine stereotypes can potentially harm women's candidacies (Alexander and Andersen, 1993; Huddy and Terkildsen, 1993; Eagly and Karau, 2002; Sanbonmatsu, 2002; Holman et al, 2011, 2016; Valdini, 2019), evidence also suggests that the effect of feminine stereotypes is dynamic and dependent on the candidates' other traits. For example, Bauer (2020) argues that it is politically costly for women candidates to display feminine traits but that the impact of doing so varies by political party. Women candidates can adjust campaign messages accordingly to emphasize or obfuscate their feminine traits, though the success of this approach is limited by their partisanship and incumbency (Bauer and Santia, 2022). From a voter perspective, Bernhard (2022) offers similar results in her study on campaign messaging, in which she finds that evaluator party identification, gender, and ideological stance impact their reaction to the candidates' gendered leadership styles. In addition, candidate incumbency and partisanship have been shown to negate the effect of trait attribution (Alexander and Andersen, 1993; Dolan, 2010; Hayes, 2011; Dolan and Lynch, 2017).

Similarly, Schneider and Bos (2014) argue that women politicians do not elicit the same expectations of communal personality traits that women generally do (see also Brooks, 2013). Eagly (2007) contends that women leaders could even be rewarded for communal leadership traits in situations where displaying transformational leadership, or appearing to coach and teach those they lead, is valued. In short, while there is potential for a negative outcome for women candidates who display feminine traits, other candidate factors, such as party, incumbency, and the type of leadership role, alter the severity of the negative impact of their feminine traits on voter evaluations.

However, there continue to be many circumstances in which feminine stereotypes are destructive for women leaders; thus, the existing literature also notes the tendency

of women candidates to engage the counterstereotypic strategy of cueing masculine traits and skills. For example, [Huddy and Terkildsen \(1993\)](#) demonstrated that gender-stereotyped traits were linked to beliefs about the issue areas that men and women candidates could handle and, thus, that it might be advantageous for women to display masculine traits. In their analysis, after a switch of the stereotypical personality traits of candidates, that is, assigning the woman candidate masculine traits, women candidates were rated as handling almost all issues better, including women's issues, than when women candidates were assigned typically feminine personality traits. As [Huddy and Terkildsen \(1993: 142\)](#) conclude, "the real struggle faced by female candidates, then, is to convey successfully to voters that they possess masculine personality traits." They are not alone in noting the potential value of demonstrating masculine traits; more recent research on the effect of electoral context, such as national security crises, suggests that certain environments make masculine traits particularly valuable for candidates ([Holman et al, 2011, 2016](#)).

However, while it may be beneficial for women leaders to display masculine traits, this strategy is not uniformly beneficial or without cost. That is to say, a woman who acts like a leader, that is, a woman who displays masculine (agentic) personality traits, will potentially be punished for violating the expectation that she should exhibit feminine (communal) personality traits. There is substantial evidence that the impact of role incongruity continues to undermine the success of women candidates today ([Bauer and Carpinella, 2018](#); [Cassese and Holman, 2018](#); [Mendoza and DiMaria, 2019](#)) but that the punishment for violating one's gender role varies in severity and by the specific outcome being assessed. For example, [Bauer \(2017\)](#) examines the variation in backlash against role-incongruous women candidates by exploring the impact of party identification and finds that voters who identify with the candidate's party do not punish role incongruity, while being of the opposite party as the candidate triggers a more critical voter response. In other words, a counterstereotypic strategy can be advantageous because it allows women candidates to signal the positive leadership traits associated with men while not violating gender norms, but this effect varies by whether the candidate and respondent are co-partisans.

Refining theory with a focus on individual beliefs

Much of the literature on the double bind facing women candidates operates with the assumption that what people perceive to be important in a good leader is monolithic within society. The underlying logic behind such psychology-driven assumptions is that views of what constitutes good leadership are based on society-wide perceptions, understanding, and prejudice that all individuals internalize ([Eagly and Carli, 2007: 84](#)). Social role and role incongruity theory—in which individuals are punished for failing to conform to their socially expected (congruent) roles—are thus built on societal-level premises: society expects men and women to exhibit different characteristics, subsequently punishing women who fail to demonstrate traits that match their gender identity. The crux of this logic is that perceptions and related stereotyping are a psychological and societal phenomenon, meaning that all of society ultimately shares these beliefs ([Eagly and Carli, 2007: 87–8](#)). But what if the underlying causes of differences about what constitutes good leadership or appropriate behavior are not exclusively driven by the psychology of societal

interaction and perceptions? What if views are instead conditioned by individual beliefs, or the interaction between the two?

While existing literature has focused predominantly on the impact of two voter traits (gender and political party) on role incongruity punishment, we argue that there is an important missing piece of the puzzle: whether an individual's feelings about gender egalitarianism lead to their decision to proactively and politically self-identify as a "feminist." In other words, one's gender and political party, while important, do not pick up the crucial factor of whether or how they explicitly and politically prioritize issues of gender equality, thus making them more generally sensitive (and positively inclined) toward female candidates, regardless of whether those candidates display gender-congruent behavior, and candidates who are presented as holding more feminine qualities. We begin from the related topic of views on sexism and beliefs about gender roles, where scholarship has shown that women candidates may be rated highly for their competence—a traditionally "masculine" associated characteristic—but still not deemed electable when voters exhibit views consistent with benevolent sexism (Cassidy and Krendl, 2019). Similarly, positive changes in Hillary Clinton's favorability from 2008 to 2012 were influenced by whether she was being rated by someone with a liberal versus a conservative view of gender roles (McThomas and Tesler, 2016). Drawing on similar logic applied specifically to feminist identity, we argue that the reaction to role incongruity changes depending on whether an individual is willing to explicitly identify as being a "feminist," which may translate into a preference for women in leadership roles and more feminine styles of leadership. If an individual places a high value on both the gender and gendered presentation of candidates, this will change the impact of role incongruity and gender-role violations.

In this context, belief in gender equality may be insufficient, and prior work has focused on the importance of attaching political significance to views on gender equality. In particular, the extant literature has highlighted the association between self-identifying as a feminist and preferring female candidates and/or policies that address women's interests (Conover, 1988; Roth, 2004; Elder et al, 2021). Here, the notions of feminist identity and consciousness are of particular importance: self-identifying as someone who is a "feminist" is a political identity statement with potential implications for that person's political beliefs and preferences (Conover, 1988; Kelly and Gauchat, 2016). Since the term "feminist" often carries negative connotations (Roy et al, 2007; Breen and Karpinski, 2008), scholarly work has focused on the importance of self-labeling as a predictor of political and social behavior and preference expression (Zucker and Bay-Cheng, 2010; Moore and Stathi, 2020). Following these approaches regarding the influence of self-labeling as a feminist, we offer three hypotheses to test the relationship between feminism and penalties for gender-role violations.

First, we hypothesize that if an evaluator self-labels as a feminist, they will be more likely to support women candidates than an evaluator who does not. This logic builds on a wider literature addressing the effects of feminist identity on support for specific political candidates and/or parties who support more gender-progressive policies (Conover, 1988; Hayes, 1997; Elder et al, 2021; Simien et al, 2024). This scholarship highlights the importance of the distinction of identifying by the label of "feminist" rather than expressing general support for gender egalitarianism. For example, individuals who support gender egalitarianism may hold a range of distinct

political preferences that would translate into a desire to see more women in elected office based on a belief that female elected officials will substantively represent women and women's interests more than men will. However, not all individuals who support gender-egalitarian policies necessarily support the greater descriptive representation of women; they may believe that men can also substantively represent women's interests or hold other preferences that conflict with electing a woman (for example, partisan disagreement or divergence on specific issues).

In contrast, self-identification as a feminist applies to a narrower group in society who are willing to profess a specific identity rather than broad policy attitudes (Elder et al, 2021), meaning that those who call themselves "feminists" are a distinct group. Particularly as women have historically been more likely to self-identify as feminists (McCabe, 2005), it is the subset of the population adopting this specific political label to whom claims about the broader importance of women's descriptive representation are more likely to resonate, leading to our first hypothesis:

H1: Respondents who self-identify as "feminists" are more likely to vote for women candidates than respondents who do not self-identify as "feminists."

However, a separate expectation relates to the gendered portrayal of candidates rather than their presumed gender (for example, sex). Candidates who fail to demonstrate masculine traits that are associated with good leadership will be deemed "unelectable" compared to candidates who display such masculine (for example, good leadership) traits (Bauer, 2015). Yet, individuals who identify as feminists have been shown to prioritize a host of more progressive ideals related not only to gender equality and women's issues but also to social justice more broadly construed (Kelly and Gauchat, 2016; Brielle Harbin and Margolis, 2022; Ocen and Chojnacki, 2023). In this sense, feminists should be more receptive than non-feminists to traits in leaders that comport more with "femininity," such as warmth, understanding, and compassion. Such a perspective would effectively "override," either consciously or not, societal preferences about masculine-dominated leadership traits by instead prioritizing candidates who embrace and demonstrate femininity. This is not to suggest that feminists always prefer feminine to masculine traits in their leaders, or feminine-presenting women over masculine-presenting women; they may be effectively indifferent in their preferences over which gendered traits they prefer in their everyday lives. However, since the act of self-identifying as a feminist has been argued to be a political statement on the status of women more generally, we argue that this should manifest in a distinct prioritization of valuing "non-traditional" leadership, that is, feminine leadership traits. As a result, we expect that individuals who self-identify as feminists are more likely to reward (for example, less likely to penalize) candidates who display feminine traits than those individuals who do not self-identify as feminists. Subsequently, we expect the following:

H2: Respondents who self-identify as "feminists" are more likely to reward feminine candidates than respondents who do not self-identify as "feminists."

Finally, the logic found in analyses in the literature on "partisan trespassing" by candidates, that is, when a candidate "trespasses" into the policy territory of another party, suggests that voters may react negatively due to the violation of their

expectations and associations with that party (Petrocik, 1996; Hayes, 2005). Further, Bauer (2018) examines the differences in success of partisan trespassing by gender and finds that gender stereotypes associated with the US political parties (that is, Republicans as masculine and Democrats as feminine) exacerbate these effects for women candidates. We carry this logic a step forward and argue that gender-role violation, that is, gender-role trespassing, triggers similar feelings of disappointment. Thus, since their femininity declines when women display masculine traits, which, in turn, makes some voters uncomfortable with the candidate, the cost of the gender-role violation or display of role-incongruent behavior may outweigh the benefit.

However, extending the logic underpinning H2, where feminists are expected to embrace the “non-traditional” in leadership, this effect of negative evaluations for gender-role trespassing or role incongruence should not extend to those who self-identify as a feminist. Since we expect that feminists are more likely to embrace the non-traditional, we similarly expect that they should be less likely to demonstrate a propensity to be disappointed when they encounter gender-role trespassing or role incongruence in a political candidate. Thus, despite the consistent evidence that voters are generally uncomfortable with candidates who commit gender-role violations, we suggest a more nuanced hypothesis to predict how this mechanism operates differently when comparing penalties for role incongruity between feminists and non-feminists:

H3: Respondents who self-identify as “feminists” are less likely to punish role-incongruent candidates than respondents who do not self-identify as “feminists.”

This hypothesis reflects an important distinction in the double bind for women: while displaying masculine traits could be potentially advantageous for women due to the association of these traits with leadership roles, the price for women who violate the gendered expectations of voters may be mitigated when voters are expressly concerned with gender egalitarianism per se. In other words, individuals who are willing to self-identify as feminists should be more willing to embrace the non-traditional and thus less likely to penalize both women and men for violations of their “expected” gender roles.

Research method: survey experiment

We conducted a survey experiment in 2019 using a nationally representative sample in the US fielded by QualtricsLLC (Arizona State University IRB STUDY #STUDY00006303). The experiment ran from October 30 to November 7 and yielded 2,513 respondents randomly distributed across the control and treatment groups who identified as “male” or “female”; 1,861 of these respondents met our attention check and are included in the results discussed in the following.¹ The survey was deployed two weeks after the fourth debate of the Democratic presidential primary contest on October 15, 2019, which featured 12 different candidates (four women and eight men). It was in this debate that Elizabeth Warren had an especially strong performance, leading to subsequent positive press coverage of her candidacy. As a result, our experiment ran during a period of time of relatively high political salience amid Democratic efforts to find a nominee to challenge President Donald

Trump and while the public opinion polling gap between Joe Biden (the polling leader throughout 2019) and Warren had closed to within three percentage points.

Prior to the treatment, respondents answered a series of questions, including on a range of political feeling thermometers, views on current events, and political knowledge. All respondents read a short news article based on campaign coverage of and statements by a fictitious candidate running for a state senate seat in Colorado.² The issue discussed in the news article was focused on the general topic of job creation. Each respondent received one of 12 treatments, which modified candidate sex (male versus female), party (Democratic versus Republican), and gendered description (control versus feminine versus masculine). In the feminine treatments, additional information or details conveyed feminine characteristics or feminine-oriented perspectives, such as language about being “family-focused”; in the masculine treatments, additional information or details conveyed masculine characteristics or masculine-oriented perspectives, such as confrontational language about “pushing” others to comply with the candidate’s preferences or referring to workers as having gotten “beaten up” by a weak economy and limited job prospects. Table 1 outlines the 12 treatment conditions, with the text of the control and treatment articles available in Online Appendix A.

Table 1: Treatment types and observations (after excluding failed attention checks)

<i>N</i>	Gender	Party	Gendered depiction	Excerpt of text that varied by gendered depiction
148	John	Democratic	Control	Colorado State Senator and Democrat Jessica Perkins spoke about the economic health of Colorado, stating that “We’ve got a 5 point jobs creation plan and we’ve talked about it across the state and listened. What we’ve heard is we really need to focus on infrastructure in this part of the state. We need to make Colorado a state where people want to move their businesses, and then the jobs will follow.”
163	John	Republican	Control	
161	Jessica	Democratic	Control	
155	Jessica	Republican	Control	
156	John	Democratic	Feminine	Colorado State Senator and Democrat Jessica Perkins spoke about the economic health of Colorado, stating that “our families depend on a healthy economy” and that “we need to make this a state where people can get good jobs, earn a good wage, and provide for our kids. As a mother myself, I know how it feels to wake up in the middle of the night and worry about our kids and the economy they will inherit. That’s why I make supporting Colorado’s families my top priority.”
160	John	Republican	Feminine	
149	Jessica	Democratic	Feminine	
158	Jessica	Republican	Feminine	
157	John	Democratic	Masculine	Colorado State Senator and Democrat Jessica Perkins spoke about the economic health of Colorado, stating that “Everyone should be able to benefit from a good economy and that’s what I’m going to push for state leaders to do. My father was a mill worker, so I know what it’s like to have to struggle to keep a good job and steady employment. Working people in our state are tired of getting beaten up and having no one stick up for them, so I consider it my top priority to fight for them.”
156	John	Republican	Masculine	
151	Jessica	Democratic	Masculine	
160	Jessica	Republican	Masculine	

Following the treatment, we asked respondents to complete an attention check and a short series of post-treatment questions regarding their view of the candidate about whom they read. For our dependent variable, we focus on candidate electability by asking the respondent to rate their perception of the candidate's likelihood of being re-elected. The response option is a 100-point scale, with higher values corresponding to a respondent's view that the candidate has a greater chance of being elected.³

Following the post-treatment questions, we asked respondents to answer a series of demographic questions. Then, in the final question of the survey, we asked respondents how much they would identify themselves as a feminist. The placement at the conclusion of the survey, after multiple questions including demographic questions unrelated to the treatment or politics, was done intentionally to reduce the risk of post-treatment bias.⁴ Taking as our starting point a focus on the extent to which individuals consciously identify themselves as feminists, we follow extant literature that perceives that such conscious identification in how an individual thinks of themselves is what exerts an impact on their behavior and how they look at the world (Conover, 1988; Yoder et al, 2011; Kelly and Gauchat, 2016). Rather than a "yes/no" response option to the question "Do you identify as a feminist?," we offered a seven-point Likert scale asking about the strength of a respondent's agreement that they would identify as a "feminist," with higher values corresponding to stronger identification as a "feminist." Our feminist self-identification measure correlates with respondent gender at 0.1562 and respondent party identification at -0.1955, suggesting that this measure reflects a distinct form of identity.

Rather than assume the treatments convey equivalent strength of gendered characteristics across conditions, we asked respondents a post-treatment question about their perception of the candidate's masculinity or femininity. In Online Appendix B, we compare the response to this question with the actual assigned treatment (feminine, masculine, or control). The results suggest that our respondents appear to be more attentive to femininity and masculinity for the role-congruent treatments (masculine men and feminine women), and especially so for women. As a result, we err on the side of evaluating the effects of this perceptual gender bias rather than the assigned treatment type and include this measure of a candidate's perceived masculinity and femininity alongside the binary measure of feminist self-identification. These are run as separate models to account for the distinct paths to influencing respondent views of candidate electability (that is, role incongruence depending on candidate sex). We then include the interaction between feminist self-identification and the perceived masculinity/femininity of the candidate to account for the expectation that feminists view candidates distinctly based on perceived role (in)congruence (H2). In addition to the interactions and their constituent terms, we control for other common predictors that might influence respondents' evaluations of candidate qualification. These include respondent gender, age, race, income, and party identification.

Finally, to account for the potential difference in the evaluation of male and female candidates who are perceived to exhibit more or less role congruence, we split our sample by the sex of the candidate. We do this to control for the possibility that respondents may express their identification with feminism but that this does not necessarily extend to a similar support for feminine candidates if the femininity of the candidate violates expected social roles (H3). Therefore, it may be that respondents who profess identification with feminism are supportive of female candidates they perceive to be feminine but that this may not extend to male candidates they perceive

to be feminine or female candidates they perceive to be masculine. Splitting the sample allows us to isolate the effects of the interaction of role incongruence with candidate perceptions and self-identified feminism on electability for men and women separately.

Results

We conduct a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on the full sample to test H1 and H2 in [Table 2](#). Then, we move on to subsetting the sample in [Table 3](#) by the sex of the candidate in the vignette to test H3. In Model 1, the coefficient for the interaction term between the variable of candidate sex and the variable of feminist self-identification is positive but not statistically significant, providing no support for H1. In contrast, the coefficients for the interaction terms between the feminist self-identification variable and variables measuring candidate perception are statistically significant and positive (for perceived femininity) and negative (for perceived masculinity). These provide initial support for H2.

To better visualize the impact of the interaction between feminist self-identification and perceived femininity or masculinity, the images in [Figure 1](#) show the marginal effects comparing candidate electability when accounting for the “feminine” perception of a candidate (left) or the “masculine” perception of a candidate (right). These figures, derived from Models 2 and 3, show the interaction of feminist self-identification with these gendered perceptions of the candidate. To evaluate hypothesis H2, we compare the two types of candidates represented on each side of the figure. Among respondents who least identify as feminists (that is, “1” on our seven-point scale), feminine-perceived candidates (the black markers in the left-hand graph) are rated as less electable compared to those who are not perceived as feminine (the grey markers in the left-hand graph); thus, the gap shrinks as the respondent increasingly self-identifies with feminism. We also see the reverse gap among non-feminists (that is, under “4” on our seven-point scale), where candidates perceived as masculine are rated as much more electable than candidates who are not perceived as masculine; these gaps are substantial and statistically significant at the $p = 0.05$ level.

In contrast, when focusing on the ratings of respondents who self-identify as feminist (that is, higher than “4” on our seven-point scale), the relationship reverses, where feminine-perceived candidates are rated as increasingly more electable than their non-feminine counterparts among those who identify more with feminism; these gaps are statistically significant. In contrast, masculine-perceived candidates are rated as modestly less electable than their non-masculine counterparts by respondents scoring higher on feminist self-identification, but these differences among self-identified feminists never reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Across [Figure 1](#), the electability ratings of “feminine-perceived” candidates by self-identified feminists are the highest of all candidates. This provides support for H2, with self-identified feminists being more likely to reward candidates who are perceived to be feminine.

We now turn to the more complex comparisons needed to evaluate H3, splitting our sample between men and women candidates. In considering the relationship between feminism and preference for or acceptance of non-traditional leadership, we are moving beyond the question of a feminist’s affinity with women or the non-traditional when embodied by a woman. Instead, our approach here considers whether feminists are more supportive of role-incongruent behavior regardless of

Table 2: Feminism, sex, and gendered perception on willingness to vote for the candidate

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Feminist	1.137** (0.398)	0.732* (0.319)	1.885*** (0.312)
Female candidate	0.442 (2.105)	1.703 (1.009)	2.622** (1.016)
Feminist * female candidate	0.515 (0.520)		
"Feminine" candidate rating	2.380 (1.328)	-10.163*** (2.760)	
"Masculine" candidate rating	4.381*** (1.372)		12.224*** (2.674)
Feminist * "feminine" candidate rating		3.080*** (0.638)	
Feminist * "masculine" candidate rating			-2.427*** (0.679)
Gender	1.555 (1.073)	1.564 (1.068)	1.535 (1.068)
Age	1.298*** (0.332)	1.318*** (0.331)	1.220*** (0.329)
Race (baseline = White)			
Black	-0.480 (1.659)	-0.413 (1.653)	-0.330 (1.653)
Asian/Pacific Islander	-1.792 (2.534)	-1.991 (2.526)	-1.835 (2.527)
Latino/a	-3.915 (2.274)	-4.305 (2.264)	-4.236 (2.269)
Native American/American Indian	1.027 (4.935)	1.459 (4.918)	0.719 (4.923)
Mixed	-0.694 (3.582)	-0.851 (3.567)	-0.614 (3.569)
No response	-11.921 (7.150)	-10.894 (7.129)	-12.467 (7.132)
Income	0.689** (0.270)	0.690** (0.269)	0.682** (0.269)
Party ID (baseline = no party ID)			
Democrat	9.899*** (2.395)	10.381*** (2.386)	9.990*** (2.388)
Republican	6.522** (2.422)	6.795** (2.412)	6.799** (2.412)
Independent	7.996*** (2.430)	8.277*** (2.422)	8.129*** (2.424)
Third party (Green, Libertarian, and so on)	5.798 (4.307)	6.057 (4.293)	5.813 (4.296)
Constant	43.092*** (2.979)	45.263*** (2.789)	40.912*** (2.820)
N	1,861	1,861	1,861
R-squared	0.0540	0.0601	0.0584

Note: * p -value ≤ 0.05 ; ** p -value ≤ 0.01 ; *** p -value ≤ 0.001 .


Table 3: Split-sample interaction of feminism and role congruence on candidate electability

	Men candidates	Women candidates
	Model 4	Model 5
Feminist	0.813 (0.443)	1.747*** (0.408)
Role-incongruent candidate rating	-21.515*** (5.755)	14.032** (5.232)
Feminist * role incongruent candidate rating (baseline = non-feminist and role-congruent rating)	5.063*** (1.305)	-2.890* (1.299)
Gender	2.248 (1.548)	0.925 (1.489)
Age	0.826 (0.489)	1.572*** (0.452)
Race (baseline = White)		
Black	1.437 (2.453)	-0.2.335 (2.242)
Asian/Pacific Islander	0.571 (3.542)	-4.463 (3.621)
Latino/a	-3.968 (3.489)	-4.796 (2.991)
Native American/American Indian	-3.083 (7.685)	2.779 (6.388)
Mixed	-3.318 (4.839)	2.855 (5.334)
No response	-17.726 (10.847)	-5.119 (9.469)
Income	0.585 (0.384)	0.812* (0.377)
Party ID (baseline = no party ID)		
Democrat	5.020 (3.532)	15.545*** (3.258)
Republican	4.849 (3.571)	9.057** (3.288)
Independent	6.341 (3.588)	10.367** (3.297)
Third party (Green, Libertarian, and so on)	2.556 (6.454)	9.285 (5.754)
Constant	49.526*** (4.012)	39.896*** (3.746)
N	927	934
R-squared	0.0421	0.0915

Note: * p -value ≤ 0.05 ; ** p -value ≤ 0.01 ; *** p -value ≤ 0.001 .

the sex of the candidate. In other words: Do feminists evaluate role-incongruent candidates, whether masculine-perceived women or feminine-perceived men, as more electable than non-feminists? To answer this question, in Table 3, we run OLS models replacing the perceived “feminine” and “masculine” variables with a role-incongruity variable interacted with feminist self-identification and splitting the sample by the sex of the candidate. This allows us to test whether a respondent’s

Figure 1: Electability of feminine- and masculine-perceived candidates




strength of feminist self-identification and their perception of a candidate's role incongruity differently shape electability when evaluating a woman or a man.

Once again, we plot the marginal effects as a clearer way to demonstrate substantive impact. Figure 2 shows candidate electability when accounting for the interaction between feminist self-identification and perceived role incongruence for a man candidate (left) versus a woman candidate (right). Looking at Figure 2, the slopes of both grey lines indicating the electability ratings of role-congruent candidates are relatively flat and highly similar for men and women. This suggests that role-congruent men and women are evaluated quite similarly, regardless of the feminist self-identification of their evaluator. However, the influence of feminist self-identification on the electability of perceived role-incongruent candidates is highly conditioned by the sex of the candidate. In the left-hand graph, feminist respondents most highly evaluate the electability of role-incongruent (that is, feminine-perceived) men, while non-feminist respondents rate the same role-incongruent men the lowest. This suggests partial support for H3 regarding feminist support for role-incongruent (that is, feminine) men. That feminine-perceived men are especially poorly rated by non-feminists signifies the substantial penalty that role-incongruent men candidates face when evaluated by individuals with a relatively traditional worldview of gender.

Conversely, the right-hand graph suggests that self-identified feminists are more likely to penalize role-incongruent women than non-feminists, with a slight downward slope to the black line. However, the confidence intervals for this distinction indicate that the difference is not statistically significant. While feminists do not appear to penalize role-incongruent women more than role-congruent women from a statistically significant perspective, the results actually suggest that it is non-feminists who are more likely to reward role-incongruent (that is, masculine-perceived) women candidates. This runs contrary to our expectations for part of H3.

Taken together, these findings suggest that the femininity and gender of candidates may operate as similar or substitutive factors influencing the consideration of feminists in their evaluation of a candidate. In other words, for a feminist, the question may be about rewarding someone who embodies femininity *or* the female sex, as these

Figure 2: Electability of role-incongruent candidates by candidate sex

may be thought of as signaling similar interests or preferences to someone holding (especially self-professed) feminist beliefs. In particular, role congruence combines with feminist beliefs to matter significantly here: role-incongruent men are the most heavily penalized by non-feminists, while role-congruent women and role-incongruent men are the most heavily favored by feminists. These results support the idea that role congruence suggests an additive or augmenting effect on feminists' support for (non-traditional) role-congruent women candidates. The wide confidence intervals for the point estimates of role-incongruent candidates also reflect the influence of role congruence in another way: 11 percent of the 931 men candidates and 8 percent of the 943 women candidates were perceived to be role incongruent, compared to 27 percent of men candidates and 28 percent of women candidates who were perceived to be role congruent. This may suggest further resistance to role incongruity by respondents, given the even distribution of men and women candidates into the different treatments, contrasted with the overwhelming amount of perceived role congruence by respondents in the sample. Even as non-feminists most severely penalize men they do not perceive to be masculine, non-feminists do not apply a similarly significant penalty to women they do not perceive to be masculine. Across all types of candidates, this penalty for role-incongruent men accrued specifically when respondents did not self-identify as feminist. Feminists are more likely than non-feminists to express a willingness to vote for candidates who are not perceived as masculine.

On balance, our findings confirm that one's self-identification as a feminist exerts an important and significant effect on the likelihood of voting for men and women candidates who violate or support pre-existing gender norms (for example, role congruence). Compared to non-feminists, feminists are more supportive of both men and women candidates who violate traditional leadership expectations (for example, candidates perceived as "feminine"), as well as some who violate gender role congruence (for example, men candidates perceived as "feminine"). Yet, while non-feminists are more supportive of all candidates who conform to traditional

leadership expectations (for example, candidates perceived as “masculine”), they especially punish men who violate gender norms (for example, men candidates perceived as “feminine”).

Robustness checks

We run two robustness checks to account for alternative arguments and measurement issues. First, we run the same analysis using the treatment types (role-congruent men and women candidates; role-incongruent men and women candidates) with the control groups as the baseline. In this series of robustness checks (reported in Online Appendix C), the same general patterns hold but the treatments and interactions with self-identified feminism do not show much difference in substantive effect or reach statistical significance at the 0.05 level. It should be recalled that the treatment types did not map especially well onto respondent perceptions of candidate masculinity or femininity. We attribute the lack of differentiation and significance to this gap between what the treatments were intended to convey about candidate role congruence and how individual perceptions override the signal the treatments were designed to communicate.

Finally, recent work shows that partisanship moderates the relationship between feminism and political outcomes in the US context ([Ocono and Morrell, 2024](#)). To address this important potential moderator, we consider whether the party affiliation of the candidate influences their electability with feminist and non-feminist voters. We rerun our analyses with an additionally splitting by the partisan label of the candidate, with full results reported in Online Appendix D. In general, the pattern reflects similar findings about feminism’s influence, particularly in an interactive sense, but with less statistical significance as a result of reducing the number of observations once the sample is split by the candidate’s party (Republican or Democrat). Masculine-perceived Republican men and women were less likely to be rated positively by feminists than their Democratic counterparts, but feminists similarly and positively rated both Republican and Democratic men and women who were perceived to be feminine. This suggests that among strongly feminist respondents, perceptions of masculinity hurt Republicans more than Democrats regardless of candidate sex but that perceptions of femininity were positively associated with candidates regardless of their party. We interpret this as further support for H2.

Discussion

Studies in social psychology and political science have noted the negative impact of the “double bind” facing women leaders and candidates and have found that women must demonstrate both masculine and feminine attributes in order to achieve the same success as men can achieve by demonstrating only masculine attributes. Yet, while existing literature has investigated evaluator party identification and gender on reactions to role incongruity, we offer the first analysis of how respondent identification as a feminist can change the respondent’s reactions to both gender preferences and perceived displays of role incongruity. We find evidence that respondents who profess themselves to be feminists generally judge candidates perceived to be feminine more positively; they also view role-incongruent men less negatively than respondents who do not profess themselves to be feminists, with role-incongruent men rated the least

electable of all groups by non-feminists. In effect, feminism in voters may neutralize the potential effects of role incongruity, especially for men, which may help feminine candidates in the long run if more people become or embrace feminism.

From a theoretical standpoint, we considered how role-incongruent candidates might suffer penalties for failure to conform to societal expectations of women or benefit from success in conforming to traditional expectations of leaders. Yet, we find little evidence that role-incongruent women are severely punished by feminists or non-feminists for displaying masculine (and role-incongruent) traits. In contrast, role-incongruent men are punished to the point that they are the least electable group for non-feminists, but feminists found them just as electable as role-congruent women. This suggests the influence of role congruence on electability remains strong for certain candidates—just not the candidates presumed to be most vulnerable for failures to conform to societal gender-role expectations. Our findings that non-feminist respondents punish role-incongruent men but not role-incongruent women, while feminist respondents are equally likely to reward role-incongruent men and women, suggest limits to claims about the benefits of portraying oneself as a man in touch with his femininity.

Our research suggests that future scholarship should not work from the assumption that party identification and gender are the only factors that impact how voters react to role incongruity. Instead, it is valuable to question the monolithic assumption that all voters want the same traits in their leaders and to consider how their varied preferences for leaders may change their reactions to role-incongruent women and men. This is particularly relevant as more women enter the political arena, as our research suggests that they may want to perform as less or more feminine depending on whether they perceive that their constituents value gender egalitarianism and are politically motivated regarding candidates and policies embodying those values. In other words, a one-size-fits-all approach to handling the challenge of role incongruity is not advised. Instead, a more nuanced approach might be appropriate, acknowledging that some people may punish a lack of displayed femininity in candidates of both sexes because they value gender egalitarianism, while other people will reward the demonstration of traditional masculine traits and will more heavily punish role-incongruent men who fail to conform to both gender norms and displays of masculinity.

Future scholarship could also further explore the specific mechanisms underpinning feminism's effect on the embrace of role-incongruent behavior. For example, feminists are not a monolithic group in many respects, even if they all notionally support gender egalitarianism. The distinct feminist waves, corresponding to different generational cohorts with distinct life experiences and who attach different relative importance to intersectionality, may produce self-identified feminists who have distinct views and are distinctly inclined to favor different non-traditional leadership candidates, for example, role-incongruent versus role-congruent women or role-incongruent women versus role-incongruent men. Alternatively, recent work has highlighted the importance of considering the political behavior of non-labelers who still endorse feminist values and gender-egalitarian beliefs (Ocen, 2020). If the mechanism driving feminist self-identified respondents' support for role-incongruent candidates has less to do with the label of feminism and more with underlying beliefs, it stands to reason that non-labelers who share these beliefs may also share support for role-incongruent candidates. Future survey and experimental work could investigate this proposition, which, if correct, would suggest additional support for non-traditional candidates in the future.

Notes

¹ Since the attention check asked for recall of information conveyed in the treatment vignette—what general policy area does the article discuss—we consider it problematic to include respondents who could not immediately recall the policy (the economy) from among four multiple-choice options (the environment, the economy, defense, and the arts). However, as indicated in Table 1, there is strong sample balance when those failing the attention check are excluded. Robustness checks using the full sample show highly similar results, as reported in Online Appendix C.

² We chose a state senate race because respondents would be less familiar with names of state senators outside of their own state of residence and Colorado because it was a sufficiently purple state in 2019, where a Democratic or Republican candidate might plausibly offer similar statements on the issue of job creation.

³ As robustness checks, we also rerun our models, looking at four alternative dependent variables of responses to four questions: (1) “How qualified do you think Senator Perkins is for her/his office?”; (2) “How much do you agree with Senator Perkins’ policies?”; (3) “How much do you think Senator Perkins represents people like you?”; and (4) “How likely would you be to vote for Senator Perkins?” The results for each of these models, with alternative dependent variables measured on a five-point Likert scale, are highly similar to those in the main results and reported in Online Appendix D.

⁴ To assess whether potential post-treatment bias occurred, we evaluated whether there was a gap between feminist self-identification based on the sex of the candidate in the treatment. *T*-tests comparing treatment group average scores on our feminist self-identification measure showed no statistically significant differences, with *p*-values of 0.2011 for the gender treatment difference, 0.3324 for the control to masculine/feminine treatment difference, and 0.2881 for the party treatment difference.

ORCID IDs

Sarah Shair-Rosenfield  <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5676-0947>

Melody E. Valdini  <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1199-5069>

Funding

Funding for this study was provided by the Departments of Political Science at Arizona State University and Portland State University.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Cameron Thies and Arizona State University for providing funding to conduct the survey experiment and Fabian Neuner and Nick Pyeatt for helpful comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are our own.

Research ethics statement

The study was approved according to the human subjects research protocol at Arizona State University (Ref: ASU IRB ID STUDY00006303).

Data replication statement

The authors take responsibility for the integrity of the data and the accuracy of the analysis. Data to replicate analyses in the article are publicly available at: https://osf.io/4wne3/overview?view_only=4a82e721e27541a8b6b4f5d7ce427ea2

Author biographies

Sarah Shair-Rosenfield is a professor of comparative politics at the University of York, UK. She specializes in political institutions, gender and politics, subnational politics, and the politics of Southeast Asia. Her work has been published in the *Journal of Politics*, *Gender & Society*, *Political Science Research & Methods*, and *Electoral Studies*.

Melody E. Valdini is a professor of political science at Portland State University, USA. She specializes in the consequences of institutional design, with a focus on electoral systems, political parties, and women's leadership. Her work has been published in the *American Journal of Political Science*, *Journal of Politics*, and *Political Research Quarterly*.

Jeanette Morehouse Mendez is Provost, Senior Vice President, and Professor of Political Science at Oklahoma State University, USA. She specializes in political information processing, political behavior, and political communication. Her work has been published in the *Journal of Politics*, *Political Research Quarterly*, *Social Science Quarterly*, *Political Psychology*, and *Politics and Gender*.

Tracy Osborn is an associate professor of political science at the University of Iowa, USA. She specializes in women and politics in US state legislatures, Congress, and political behavior. Her work has been published in *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, *Political Research Quarterly*, *American Political Research*, *Politics and Gender*, and *Politics, Groups, and Identities*.

Conflict of interest

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

References

- Alexander, D. and Andersen, K. (1993) Gender as a factor in the attribution of leadership traits, *Political Research Quarterly*, 46: 527–45, doi: [10.2307/448946](https://doi.org/10.2307/448946)
- Bauer, N.M. (2015) Emotional, sensitive, and unfit for office? Gender stereotype activation and support female candidates, *Political Psychology*, 36(6): 691–708, doi: [10.1111/pops.12186](https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12186)
- Bauer, N.M. (2017) The effects of counterstereotypic gender strategies on candidate evaluations, *Political Psychology*, 38(2): 279–95, doi: [10.1111/pops.12351](https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12351)
- Bauer, N.M. (2018) Untangling the relationship between partisanship, gender stereotypes, and support for female candidates, *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy*, 39(1): 1–25, doi: [10.1080/1554477x.2016.1268875](https://doi.org/10.1080/1554477x.2016.1268875)
- Bauer, N.M. (2019) The effects of partisan trespassing strategies across candidate sex, *Political Behavior*, 41: 897–915, doi: [10.1007/s11109-018-9475-3](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-018-9475-3)
- Bauer, N.M. (2020) Shifting standards: how voters evaluate the qualifications of female and male candidates, *The Journal of Politics*, 82(1): 1–12, doi: [10.1086/705817](https://doi.org/10.1086/705817)
- Bauer, N.M. and Carpinella, C. (2018) Visual information and candidate evaluations: the influence of feminine and masculine images on support for female candidates, *Political Research Quarterly*, 71(2): 395–407, doi: [10.1177/1065912917738579](https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912917738579)
- Bauer, N.M. and Santia, M. (2022) Going feminine: identifying how and when female candidates emphasize feminine and masculine traits on the campaign trail, *Political Research Quarterly*, 75(3): 691–705, doi: [10.1177/10659129211020257](https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129211020257)
- Bernhard, R. (2022) Wearing the pants (suit)? Gendered leadership styles, partisanship, and candidate evaluation in 2016 US election, *Politics & Gender*, 18(2): 513–45.
- Breen, A.B. and Karpinski, A. (2008) What's in a name? Two approaches to evaluating the label feminist, *Sex Roles*, 58: 299–310, doi: [10.1007/s11199-007-9317-y](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-007-9317-y)

- Brielle Harbin, M. and Margolis, M.F. (2022) Nobody's free until everybody's free: how feminist identification influences white Americans' willingness to recognize and respond to racial discrimination, *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 10(4): 511–35, doi: [10.1080/21565503.2020.1846132](https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2020.1846132)
- Brooks, D.J. (2013) *He Runs, She Runs: Why Gender Stereotypes Do Not Harm Women Candidates*, Princeton University Press.
- Cassese, E.C. and Holman, M.R. (2018) Party and gender stereotypes in campaign attacks, *Political Behavior*, 40(3): 785–807, doi: [10.1007/s11109-017-9423-7](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-017-9423-7)
- Cassidy, B.S. and Krendl, A.C. (2019) A crisis of competence: benevolent sexism affects evaluations of women's competence, *Sex Roles*, 81: 505–20, doi: [10.1007/s11199-019-1011-3](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-019-1011-3)
- Conover, P.J. (1988) Feminists and the gender gap, *Journal of Politics*, 50(4): 985–1010, doi: [10.2307/2131388](https://doi.org/10.2307/2131388)
- Dolan, K. (2010) The impact of gender stereotyped evaluations on support for women candidates, *Political Behavior*, 32(1): 69–88, doi: [10.1007/s11109-009-9090-4](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-009-9090-4)
- Dolan, K. and Lynch, T. (2017) Do candidates run as women and men or Democrats and Republicans? The impact of party and sex on issue campaigns, *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy*, 38(4): 522–46, doi: [10.1080/1554477x.2016.1268876](https://doi.org/10.1080/1554477x.2016.1268876)
- Eagly, A.H. (2007) Female leadership advantage and disadvantage: resolving the contradictions, *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 31(1): 1–12, doi: [10.1111/j.1471-6402.2007.00326.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.2007.00326.x)
- Eagly, A.H. and Carli, L.L. (2007) *Through the Labyrinth: The Truth About How Women Become Leaders*, Harvard Business Press.
- Eagly, A.H. and Carli, L.L. (2012) Women and the labyrinth of leadership, in W.E. Rosenbach, R.L. Taylor and M.A. Youndt (eds) *Contemporary Issues in Leadership*, 2nd edn, Routledge, pp 147–62.
- Eagly, A.H. and Karau, S.J. (2002) Role congruity theory of prejudice toward female leaders, *Psychological Review*, 109(3): 573–98, doi: [10.1037/0033-295x.109.3.573](https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.109.3.573)
- Elder, L., Greene, S. and Lizotte, M.-K. (2021) Feminist and anti-feminist identification in the 21st century United States, *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy*, 42(3): 243–59, doi: [10.1080/1554477x.2021.1929607](https://doi.org/10.1080/1554477x.2021.1929607)
- Hayes, B. (1997) Gender, feminism, and electoral behavior in Britain, *Electoral Studies*, 16(2): 203–16, doi: [10.1016/S0261-3794\(97\)00012-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0261-3794(97)00012-7)
- Hayes, D. (2005) Candidate qualities through a partisan lens: a theory of trait ownership, *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(4): 908–23, doi: [10.2307/3647705](https://doi.org/10.2307/3647705)
- Hayes, D. (2011) When gender and party collide: stereotyping in candidate trait attribution, *Politics & Gender*, 7(2): 133–65, doi: [10.1017/s1743923x11000055](https://doi.org/10.1017/s1743923x11000055)
- Holman, M.R., Merolla, J.L. and Zechmeister, E.J. (2011) Sex, stereotypes, and security: a study of the effects of terrorist threat on assessments of female leadership, *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy*, 32(3): 173–92, doi: [10.1080/1554477x.2011.589283](https://doi.org/10.1080/1554477x.2011.589283)
- Holman, M.R., Merolla, J.L. and Zechmeister, E.J. (2016) Terrorist threat, male stereotypes, and candidate evaluations, *Political Research Quarterly*, 69(1): 134–47, doi: [10.1177/1065912915624018](https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912915624018)
- Huddy, L. and Terkildsen, N. (1993) Gender stereotypes and the perception of male and female candidates, *American Journal of Political Science*, 37(1): 119–47, doi: [10.2307/2111526](https://doi.org/10.2307/2111526)
- Kelly, M. and Gauchat, G. (2016) Feminist identity, feminist politics: U.S. feminists' attitudes toward social policies, *Sociological Perspectives*, 59(4): 855–72, doi: [10.1177/0731121415594281](https://doi.org/10.1177/0731121415594281)

- McCabe, J. (2005) What's in a label? The relationship between feminist self identification and "feminist" attitudes among U.S. women and men, *Gender & Society*, 19(4): 480–505.
- McThomas, M. and Tesler, M. (2016) The growing influence of gender attitudes on public support for Hillary Clinton, 2008–2012, *Politics & Gender*, 12(1): 28–49, doi: [10.1017/s1743923x15000562](https://doi.org/10.1017/s1743923x15000562)
- Mendoza, S.A. and DiMaria, M.G. (2019) Not "with her": how gendered political slogans affect conservative women's perceptions of female leaders, *Sex Roles*, 80: 1–10, doi: [10.1007/s11199-018-0910-z](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-018-0910-z)
- Moore, A. and Stathi, S. (2020) The impact of feminist stereotypes and sexual identity on feminist self-identification and collective action, *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 160(3): 267–81, doi: [10.1080/00224545.2019.1644280](https://doi.org/10.1080/00224545.2019.1644280)
- Oceno, M. (2020) *The Feminist Paradox: How Labels Keep Women Candidates from Equal Representation*, PhD dissertation.
- Oceno, M. and Chojnacki, L. (2023) Feminism within parties: implications for political elite evaluations and policy attitudes, *Research & Politics*, 10(3), doi: [10.1177/20531680231197254](https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680231197254)
- Oceno, M. and Morell, S. (2024) Toeing the party line: the asymmetric influence of feminism on partisans' participation, *British Journal of Political Science*, 54(3): 917–27, doi: [10.1017/s0007123423000510](https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123423000510)
- Petrocik, J.R. (1996) Issue ownership in presidential elections, with a 1980 case study, *American Journal of Political Science*, 40(3): 825–50, doi: [10.2307/2111797](https://doi.org/10.2307/2111797)
- Roth, B. (2004) *Separate Roads to Feminism*, Cambridge University Press.
- Roy, R.E., Weibust, K.S. and Miller, C.T. (2007) Effects of stereotypes about feminists on feminist self-identification, *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 31(2): 146–56, doi: [10.1111/j.1471-6402.2007.00348.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.2007.00348.x)
- Sanbonmatsu, K. (2002) Gender stereotypes and vote choice, *American Journal of Political Science*, 46: 20–34, doi: [10.2307/3088412](https://doi.org/10.2307/3088412)
- Sanbonmatsu, K. and Dolan, K. (2009) Do gender stereotypes transcend party?, *Political Research Quarterly*, 62(3): 485–94, doi: [10.1177/1065912908322416](https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912908322416)
- Schneider, M.C. and Bos, A.L. (2014) Measuring stereotypes of female politicians, *Political Psychology*, 35(2): 245–66, doi: [10.1111/pops.12040](https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12040)
- Simien, E.M., Hayes, T.J. and Conway, C. (2024) The democratic majority and the 2016 American presidential election: feminist political behavior across multiple axes of identity, *Political Research Quarterly*, 77(1): 371–85, doi: [10.1177/10659129231213014](https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129231213014)
- Sweet-Cushman, J. (2022) Legislative vs. executive political offices: how gender stereotypes can disadvantage women in either office, *Political Behavior*, 44(1): 411–34, doi: [10.1007/s11109-021-09721-x](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-021-09721-x)
- Valdini, M.E. (2019) *The Inclusion Calculation: Why Men Appropriate Women's Representation*, Oxford University Press.
- Williams, J.E. and Best, D.L. (1990) *Measuring Sex Stereotypes: A Multination Study (rev edn)*, Sage Publications, Inc.
- Yoder, J.D., Tobias, A. and Snell, A.F. (2011) When declaring "I am a feminist" matters: labeling is linked to activism, *Sex Roles*, 64(1–2): 9–18, doi: [10.1007/s11199-010-9890-3](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-010-9890-3)
- Zucker, A.N. and Bay-Cheng, L.Y. (2010) Minding the gap between feminist identity and attitudes: the behavioral and ideological divide between feminists and nonlabelers, *Journal of Personality*, 78(6): 1895–924, doi: [10.1111/j.1467-6494.2010.00673.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.2010.00673.x)