



## Correction to: Signals Concealing Positive Information Can Coexist in the General Beer-and-Quiche Type Games

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### Correction to: Dynamic Games and Applications

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Due to editing mistakes made by Jan Rychtář, the references to Bergstrom et al. [1] (reference number [6] in the original article) and Zollman et al. [2] (reference number [27] in the original article), while still cited nearby, were unfortunately and unintentionally missing in two places of the Introduction where the descriptions of the games were copied verbatim. Jan Rychtář sincerely apologizes for his mistakes to all affected parties.

(1) Bergstrom et al. [1] was cited at the end of the sentence immediately preceding the beer and quiche game description (paragraph eight of the Introduction) and the game was also attributed to Bergstrom et al. [1] in the caption to Fig. 1. Nevertheless, the verbatim game description should have been in a block quote and clearly attributed to Bergstrom et al. [1]. The corrected version is below; please note that the reference number is as listed in the original article.

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The original article can be found online at <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-025-00643-5>.

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The description of the game, taken from [6], is as follows:

A traveler finds himself with no choice but to have breakfast at a particularly rough bar. Visitors often end up at this bar for breakfast and the locals occasionally challenge the visitors to a fight. Some of the visitors are surly fellows who would prefer to drink beer for breakfast. Beyond their culinary preferences, surly fellows are dangerous to fight and the locals would prefer to avoid them. Not all visitors are surly, however. Some are wimpy. Wimpy visitors have a preference for quiche for breakfast, and are exactly the sort of people that the locals would like to fight. Importantly, ... the locals cannot directly observe whether the visitor is surly or wimpy [6].

(2) Zollman et al. [2] was cited in the fourth paragraph of the Introduction, however, the second paragraph of the Introduction should have been clearly attributed to Zollman et al. [2] as well. The second paragraph also contained mismatches between three author's names and reference numbers. The entire corrected paragraph is below; please note that the reference numbers are as listed in the original article.

As stated in [27], there are two types of models for costly signalling games with two players, two signals, and two actions for the receiver: (1) the differential costs models, such as in male signalling to potential mates [14, 26], red autumn leaves to parasites of plants [3], and alarm calls of preys to predators [8], where the signalling costs depend on the senders' type, and (2) the differential benefits models, such as in the Sir Philip Sidney game [21] and begging signals advertising offspring need [13], where the senders' rewards depend on the receivers' responses.

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## References

- 1 Bergstrom CT, Huttegger SM, Zollman KJ (2020) Signals without teleology. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences*, 84, 101310
- 2 Zollman KJ, Bergstrom CT, Huttegger SM (2013) Between cheap and costly signals: the evolution of partially honest communication. *Proc Royal Soc B: Biol Sci* 280(1750):20121878

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